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Abstract 
Successive UK governments since the mid-1980s have sought to create a more competitive 
framework between firms in broadcasting through interventions which constrain the market power 
of dominant players. In this working paper the gradual encroachment of the competition discourse 
is described as it undermined the longstanding social democratic model for broadcasting regulation 
while ignoring lessons from the USA about the consequences of the changes being wrought. The 
effect of the influence of this discourse on the regulatory framework, and the evolution of the 
business models of production companies, is traced as, over time, increasing consolidation between 
production companies and foreign ownership of the production sector occurred.   
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Introduction 
This working paper seeks to establish the political and economic context for the evolution of the 
business models of firms which produce TV drama in the UK today. Competition law has played a 
more significant role than has heretofore been noted in the successive political interventions which 
have changed the regulatory environment for television production.  This has resulted in the 
continuing evolution of the types of firm operating in the sector, their business models and 
ownership.  Today the competition discourse has become dominant and in so doing overturned the 
longstanding social democratic model for broadcasting regulation which had been based on ideas of 
pluralism and public interest. 
 
A new type of regulation for telecommunications emerged in the early 2000s with the creation of 
Ofcom, a converged regulator (Simpson 2004), and this increasingly impinged on broadcasting 
developments. Lunt’s and Livingstone’s (2012) review of the regulatory environment with Ofcom’s 
establishment focused on the impact of regulation on the audience and concentrated on the social 
democratic deficit which had emerged from this intervention. However, while the interests of 
audiences are clearly a crucial matter for broadcasting regulation, which programmes are produced 
and by which firms are key prior considerations in the regulatory domain. It is this area that is the 
focus of the analysis here.  
 
Creating a competitive framework between firms and negotiating the relative power of 
stakeholders, has been the objective of successive governments utilising the legal frameworks 
enshrined in European Community law and variously expressed through the Restrictive Trading 
Practices Act (1976), Competition Act (1998) and the Enterprise Act (2002). UK audio-visual 
policy since the 1990s has broad similarities with the ‘ordo-liberal’ approach, which seeks to create 
entrepreneurial forms within society (Lemke 2001). For ordo-liberalism the market can be 
constituted and is kept alive only by dint of political interventions. The drift to a market-based 
system based increasingly on competition law has underpinned the changed environment negotiated 
by production companies. It has altered their operational and organisational structures as the new 
market conditions have been established. However, like the market, competition, too, is not a 
natural fact always already part and parcel of the economic domain. In 2011, The Economist noted 
‘the smart industrial strategy for television production that Britain stumbled into where the state 
meddles in an industry in a way that promotes competition and dynamism’ (5 November 2011). 
However, whether or not the outcomes were intended this strategy has to date a telling conclusion: 
there is no British TV drama production company of scale which has emerged in the independent 
production sector that still remains in British ownership. In short, British broadcasting has become 
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ever more reliant on large, and often vertically integrated, foreign-owned ‘independents’ alongside 
the legacy duopolistic companies.  
 
And, as will be traced below, the key intervention was the change in 2004 in the terms of trade 
between the commissioning broadcasters and production companies designed to bolster the 
independent production sector. What is perplexing is that this intervention stands in sharp 
distinction to the measures introduced and then abandoned in the US two decades earlier to address 
similar issues: seeking to curb the perceived buying power of the vertically integrated networks 
when contracting with independent suppliers of programmes. These fundamental changes in the 
relationship between the broadcasters and the production sector in the UK accentuated the reforms 
wrought in the 1980s and have resulted in the British broadcasting environment that now exists: 
fragile and dependent though seen as strong and a key export growth industry, but now weakened in 
its capacity to realise the ambitions which were attributed to it in previous decades. Following the 
changes of the last thirty years there must be growing concern that the once much-lauded British 
television industry is now becoming, like Britain’s film industry, a mere adjunct of globally 
dominant US companies, continuing to produce innovative programmes in the UK but increasingly 
dependent on foreign capital and making programmes addressing a global audience. 
 
In a linked working paper, the consequences of these changes will be traced through an examination 
of the evolution of UK TV drama production companies. 
 
Regulatory interventions 
Broadcasting in the UK, as in most states, has almost always been subject to some form of 
regulatory intervention. The policy objectives have changed over time. In the last thirty years there 
has been a far reaching change from a social democratic model of public service broadcasting 
supported by a legislative framework to a market-based one invoking competition as the primary 
objective. Key interventions are now justified as combatting disparities in market power between 
producer and broadcaster. As Ariño (2004) has noted competition law applied by competition 
authorities has become the primary instrument of public intervention in communications industries. 
This trend has continued as platforms have proliferated despite doubts about the consequences 
expressed by commentators and key industry figures1.  
 
                                                 
1 At the Edinburgh International Television Festival in 2014 David Abraham was the first industry figure to comment 
on the dangers of the emerging changes in the production sector. 
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Many reports about Britain’s TV production sector have been written in the last fifteen years as the 
dominant competition discourse took shape (Mediatique 2005, 2008, 2015; Oliver & Ohlbaum 
2008, 2011, 2014, 2015; Ofcom 2005, 2006, 2007, 2015, 2016; David Graham & Associates 2000). 
In late 2015, Ofcom was requested by the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport to review 
the terms of trade which had been introduced in 2004. That report, Review of the operation of the 
television production sector, outlined the operation of the Code of Practice which underpins the 
contractual negotiations on programme tariffs between ‘qualifying independents’ and broadcasters.  
Inter alia, it noted that there was now a smaller number of producers, with the top ten producers 
accounting for 66% of all UK producer revenue as well as an increase in vertical integration and of 
the level of foreign ownership. However, although the number of independent companies had 
halved from 450 to 250 in the previous 8 years, the continued high level of entry was seen as 
confirming that the conditions existed for disruptive new companies to enter the market. 
Unsurprisingly, it did not assay the results of the earlier interventions which had led to an industrial 
strategy for broadcasting which was dependent on inward investment and had weakened rather than 
strengthened the UK’s ability to establish scalable companies able to compete in global markets.  
Furthermore, there was no consideration of whether the changes might lead to a reduction in 
programmes which reflected the diversity of Britain.  
 
A series of connected reports underpin the current economics and organisation of UK broadcasting 
production. The Peacock Report in 1986 undertook the first full economic analysis of the changed 
ecology of production following the creation of Channel 4 set up by the Broadcasting Act 1980 
following the Annan Report (1977). Then, in 1992/93, there were changes to the networking 
arrangements at ITV after the linked Office of Fair Trading and Monopolies and Mergers 
Commission (MMC) reports on the operation of the Network Centre, whose recommendations set 
loose the discursive genie of competition and markets into the UK broadcasting discourse. Finally, 
in 2002 the Phillis Report for the ITC proposed amendments to the terms of trade between the 
commissioning broadcaster and the independent producer. 
 
As will be described in a forthcoming working paper on TV drama production, these interventions 
have had a direct bearing on the business models of production companies. Firms have evolved as 
the market and incentives have changed thereby altering the ‘fitness landscape’2 for production 
companies with increasingly powerful foreign owned and financially secure ‘independents’ (non-
                                                 
2 The concept of ‘fitness landscape’ and associated terms is utilised in the analysis in the related working paper. It 
derives from the work of Stuart Kauffman (1993) whose work on biological statistics and complexity theory has been 
developed in work on organisational ecology by McKelvey (1999), Macready (1995) and others. 
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qualifying independents) now operating alongside a reducing number of autonomous ‘qualifying’ 
independents3.  
 
Markets and competition 
UK broadcasting policy has gone through a series of phases. After the end of the monopoly period 
in 1955, when ITV was established, until 1982 with the establishment of Channel 4, programme 
production had been principally carried out by the duopoly, the BBC and ITV network companies - 
vertically integrated firms, producing, broadcasting and distributing TV programmes. Thereafter 
programme production became fragmented and subject to successive regulatory interventions as 
more than 1,000 firms were established in a vastly expanded independent sector following the 
foundation of Channel 4 as a publisher-broadcaster which by statute had no programme production 
capacity.   
 
Where before 1982 independent production companies were few in number, thereafter many 
companies were founded but equally many went out of business:  a census of firms operating in the 
programme production space in the last thirty years shows both a changing density of operational 
companies (gauged by commissions or registration as a member of the trade organisation, PACT) 
and a variable landscape of firm types over the period.  
 
Measures - quotas and later a change in the terms of trade - have been introduced in succeeding 
years to foster a competitive market in programme supply. As noted above, current trends are 
towards increasing consolidation and vertical integration, alongside an expectation from Ofcom of 
continuing company formation. These start-ups, particularly in drama production, often rely on 
financial support from existing major players.  
 
There have been significant changes in the business models of companies producing television 
programming over the past 40 years, as broadcasting in the UK has moved progressively from a 
social democratic model to market-driven competition. Lunt and Livingstone contend (2012; 20) 
that ‘social democrats have increasingly, though not without contention, come to accept the liberal 
argument that markets must be deregulated […] so as to encourage competition and stimulate 
innovation while also protecting consumers’. The acceleration of this acceptance after the early 
2000s led to major changes in relationships across the value chain as the interdependencies of talent 
and production with distribution and platforms/channels were transformed. As competition law was 
                                                 
3 Non-qualifying independents are those companies which are owned by broadcasters active in the UK market. 
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increasingly applied in the legislative discourse of broadcasting it led to pressure on the established 
conception of public interest, which had been the accepted normative framework even after the 
creation of Channel 4. An examination of the deployment of the competition and market discourse 
in broadcasting policy indicates the often unwitting complicity of major actors over more than 30 
years in a series of market-driven interventions which has transformed the broadcasting ecology.  
 
Key interventions or changes in market conditions since the late 1970s 
 
1977 • Annan Committee recommends creation of Open Broadcasting Authority 
1982 • Channel Four launches as a publisher-broadcaster 
1986 • Peacock Committee recommends 40% quota of independent productions on BBC and 
ITV 
1987 • Voluntary quotas for independent productions introduced by BBC and ITV 
1988 • White Paper: Broadcasting in the 90s: Competition, Choice and Quality 
• Launch of Sky Television 
1990 • Broadcasting Act establishes 25% statutory quotas of independent productions on 
BBC and ITV; provides for involvement of Office of Fair Trading where there are 
competition issues 
1991 • ITV Franchise Auction 
1992 • Consolidation of ITV network (1992-2004) 
• Channel 3 Networking Arrangements report by Director General of Fair Trading 
1993 • Monopolies and Mergers Commission (MMC) Report on ITV Network Centre 
• BBC Producer Choice introduced 
• ITC replaces IBA as broadcasting regulator with different terms of reference 
2000 • Publication of the Communications Bill 
2002 • Joint Committee of the House of Commons and House of Lords reviews Draft  
Communications Bill  
• ITC Report chaired by Bob Phillis recommends changes to terms of trade for  
independent sector 
2003 • Communications Act mandates a code of practice on terms of trade 
• Ofcom established as competition and content regulator 
2004 • Negotiated terms of trade and codes of practice come into force 
• Merger of Carlton and Granada to form ITV plc 
2006 • BBC Introduces Window of Creative Competition (WOCC) and reduced in-house 
guarantee 
2013 • Tax incentives introduced for ‘High-end TV Productions’ 
2016 • BBC announces abolition of WOCC and in-house guarantees and sets up BBC Studios 
 
The competitive framework in broadcasting 
In the late 1940s the first analysis of broadcasting economics in the UK was the pioneering work of 
Ronald Coase on the BBC as a monopoly actor. This coincided with – indeed was in a way a part of 
– the Beveridge Committee inquiry into broadcasting which looked closely at the monopoly 
position of the BBC. Coase’s analysis subtly criticised the monopoly of the BBC. For example, he 
queried a situation where writers were ‘working for a monopoly selling in a permanent buyer’s 
7 
market’ and observed that there was a tendency ‘to exaggerate the advantages which accrue to 
large-scale organisation and to minimise the disadvantages’. He believed the disadvantages would 
‘be particularly noticeable in such creative work as that involved in the production of broadcast 
programmes’ and concluded that ‘it is reasonable to assume that the force of competition would 
operate as a stimulus to improvements of all kinds’ (Coase, 1949:185). The Beveridge Committee’s 
report acknowledged the importance of competition in ideas but discounted the market and resolved 
only to recommend reforms to guard against those possible adverse consequences of monopoly. 
 
The minority report to the Beveridge Committee by Selwyn Lloyd, a Conservative MP who would 
later become Foreign Secretary and then Chancellor of the Exchequer, suggested a different 
solution. He disputed the argument for protecting the higher social values espoused by the BBC (he 
recoiled from Reith’s glorying in the ‘brute force of monopoly’ to underpin a policy of moral 
responsibility) and sought regulated commercial competition as was already in place in Australia 
and Canada.  The 1954 Television Act followed this alternative prescription and introduced a 
commercial ‘independent’ television system under the aegis of the Independent Television 
Authority (ITA). Competition was a central ambition of Sir Robert Fraser, the first Director General 
of the ITA. He wrote (quoted in Sendall, 1982: 66): ‘Although I want the system to be vertical in 
control, I want to see it largely horizontal in operation, in the movement of programmes - that is, I 
want a network connection technically capable of giving an unlimited introduction of programmes 
from any one region into either of the others. […] Each will be eager to sell, each eager to buy. […] 
This will be competition with a vengeance, and with all its fruits. The network must be optional - or 
it is not competition but cartel or market-sharing. […] I would like to see the Authority insist that 
each producer company should secure a proportion of its own original programmes from sub-
contractors. I do not see why this should not be fixed as a percentage, either. This would give 
competition at another level. Sub-contractors would be in competition with one another and the 
main contractors would be competing with one another for the best programmes of the sub-
contractors. If the network were compulsory there would be only one buyer for sub-contractors to 
approach’. 
 
The reality of what later came to be called the ‘carve up’ never conformed to this vision of a 
competitive supply of programming. Independent Television was destined to become a semi-
monopolistic system under powerful public control for many decades. As Sendall noted - somewhat 
pointedly - ‘the very success of the two-tiered system (public authority and private companies) 
eventually so diminished the appeal of the ideals of competition which prevailed in 1954-55 that 
competition in television, saving in the form that exists between the BBC and ITA, fell out of 
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favour’ (ibid: 67). With what became seen as the cosy duopoly between the BBC and ITV, the 
British television system became very successful culturally and economically and rated by many as 
one of the best in the world. This was a vertically integrated system with production and 
distribution under the control of the BBC and a set of commercial companies regulated by the ITA.   
 
The undermining of Britain’s vertically integrated broadcasting sector started with the publication 
of the Report of the Annan Commission in 1977.  It forcefully argued against a continuation of the 
duopoly 4 - which it saw as preventing experimentation - and responded to calls that a fourth 
channel should enable access for independent productions to the airwaves by recommending a 
publisher-broadcaster - an Open Broadcasting Authority to be set up alongside the BBC and IBA5. 
This was its version of competition, not justified by the market, which it saw as constrained by 
available financial resources, but as a source of creativity and free expression. The consequence of 
its recommendations, and the Conservative government’s interpretation of them as a fourth channel 
financed by the ITV companies, but with a remit to commission programming from independent 
production companies, was launched in 1982. ‘Independence’ for a production company was 
defined in the legislation as not having a shareholding of more than 15 per cent by a broadcaster 
(later increased to 25 per cent). However, the framing and economic viability of this intervention 
were only really subjected to stringent economic analysis in 1986 by the subsequent Peacock 
enquiry, which focused on consumer sovereignty and sketched its vision of future market 
developments of broadcasting. In so doing it went beyond the scope of its terms of reference – 
which were centrally about the future financing of the BBC.  During its deliberations the enquiry 
was lobbied intensively by the nascent independent sector to open up the duopoly to a supply of 
programming by those companies6. 
 
Channel 4’s launch had resulted in the founding of a plethora of new small independent production 
companies - the barriers to entry were low and, where necessary, Channel 4 offered business 
planning to these new entrepreneurs. By 1986 it had become clear that commissions from a single 
channel could not support the aspirations of this number of start-ups.  Markets now increasingly 
became a defining factor in the organization of British TV and how firms might negotiate the 
commissioning and licensing of programmes a continuing factor in policy deliberations. 
Furthermore, with the advent of satellite television (Sky Television launched in 1988) the previous 
                                                 
4 At the time the BBC the operated two TV channels and ITV one. 
5 Anthony Smith’s article 'When any number makes Four’ in The Guardian, 21 April 1972 was widely acknowledged 
as especially influential. 
6 See Darlow (2004) for a detailed account of this successful lobbying campaign. 
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constraints on channel availability because of spectrum scarcity became ever more central in the 
wider political calculations of Government. 
 
Even though the Peacock Commission explained that the broadcasting market was different in that 
there was a ‘good case for public financing of some broadcasting services which arguably cover 
such general benefits on the community’ (1986: 29) it recognised the need for firms to be able to 
gain commissions from more than one buyer, recommending quotas of independent productions for 
both the BBC and ITV. The duopoly was effectively broken - leading in time to wholesale changes 
in the structure and organisation of the whole production sector (Producer Choice at the BBC giving 
programme makers the power to buy services from outside the Corporation, the appointment of 
publisher-broadcasters in the ITV Network, and the debacle surrounding the creation of ITV’s 
Network Centre7) and an erosion of vertical integration with increasing reference to competition 
law in determining broadcasting policies. 
 
Peacock’s Report was followed by a White Paper in 1988 (Broadcasting, Competition, Quality and 
Choice) and then the 1990 Broadcasting Act. One small addition to the wording in the latter can be 
seen, in retrospect, as the poison pill, with the introduction of a competition regulator – the Office 
of Fair Trading (OFT) – alongside the newly-constituted Independent Television Commission (ITC) 
in determining the shape of commercial broadcasting. Section 39 of the 1990 Act – ‘Networking 
Arrangements between holders of regional Channel 3 licences’ – provided for details of proposals 
for participating in such arrangements to be sent by the Commission to the Director General of Fair 
Trading. It stipulated that the ITC had to consult with him and ‘if he requests […] any change in the 
guidance, shall incorporate the change in the guidance’8. Darlow (2004) provides candid insights 
into the lobbying process which led to the introduction of this clause. Legal counsel for the 
Independent Programme Producers’ Association (IPPA) had advised in 1987 that the ITV 
networking agreement was ‘probably a breach of the Restrictive Practices Act’. He recounts how 
frustration with the ITVA’s unwillingness to negotiate led to IPPA urging Government in early 
1988 to refer the ITV networking agreement to the Office of Fair Trading as anti-competitive (ibid: 
475). The independent producers had learned from Peacock’s critical analysis of the ITV system 
and identified the weak spot in the longstanding arrangements. 
                                                 
7 The ITV Network Centre was designed to provide a central coordinating function between the companies franchised 
to provide the ITV service. The differential power between the network companies (the larger franchises which 
provided most programming to the whole network) and the smaller regional companies (which aspired to provide a 
greater proportion of this network fare) had been a growing source of tension in the 1980s, leading to experiments with 
various arrangements. See Bonner and Aston (1998) for a full account. 
8 The legal basis for the reference to the OFT was the 1973 Fair Trading Act. 
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The 1990 legislation also introduced a further range of competition-inspired measures, in particular 
removing Channel 4 ’s reliance on ITV for advertising sales (and eventually severing the umbilical 
cord providing a financial safety net), altering the terms under which ITV franchises would be 
awarded, and perhaps most important, in creating the Independent Television Commission (ITC) to 
replace the IBA9. The ITC was to be the licensing body and regulator whereas the IBA was a 
broadcasting regulator and the legal publisher of ITV programmes. The subsequent 1996 and 2003 
legislation wrought yet further changes leading to a series of changes in ITV.  Consolidation of the 
companies owning the franchises began in 1992, resulting eventually in the emergence of ITV plc 
when Granada and Carlton, the two surviving major companies merged in 2004, with 
encouragement from a government in thrall to convergence and in the wake of the failed digital 
terrestrial service OnDigital.  
 
Peacock’s admonition of the IBA for not advancing competition on ITV, the IBA’s inability to 
influence the ITVA in its negotiations with the independent producers, and the legal opinion that 
current practices were anti-competitive, together with a recognition that a solution was needed to 
this problem, had begun further to unravel the settled environment for the duopoly broadcasters10. 
There is a significance to the changing role of the regulators: the ITA and IBA were seen as poor 
regulators (the cosy duopoly) and the poison pill of future OFT involvement can be attributed partly 
to Peacock’s scathing criticism of them. Once competition had been introduced as an element of 
regulation, the transition from the ITC to the regime later enacted through the Communications Act 
in 2003, with the creation of its much more wide-ranging and powerful successor, Ofcom, 




                                                 
9 See Goodwin (1999) for an account of the impact of Conservative Government policies on UK broadcasting between 
1979 and 1997. 
10 Furthering the invasion of competition discourses into British broadcasting policy, Rupert Murdoch delivered the 
MacTaggart lecture in 1989 at the Edinburgh Television Festival claiming that ‘in every area of economic activity in 
which competition is attainable, it is to be much preferred to monopoly’. (Murdoch, 1989: 3) 
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The changing regulatory framework 
Within a few years of the 1990 Act, the operation of the newly established Channel 3 (i.e. ITV) 
Network Centre was indeed challenged and duly referred to the Office of Fair Trading.11 This was 
the defining victory of the independent production sector. The report by the Director General of 
Fair Trading (DGFT) in 1992 summarised how the 1990 Act had changed the landscape of UK 
broadcasting.  He commented that with the emphasis on liberalisation and deregulation of markets 
‘the [1990] Act requires the examination of the competition implications of these [networking] 
arrangements’ (Office of Fair Trading 1992: 23). The application of the ‘Competition Test’ to the 
ITV Networking Agreement required that there be no restriction, distortion or prevention of 
competition in connection with any business activity in the UK. Furthermore, arrangements should 
contribute to the improvement of the production or distribution of goods or services or contribute to 
promoting technical or economic progress. As the DGFT considered that the Network Agreement 
imposed unnecessary restrictions and diminished competition, he specified modifications which he 
considered necessary to satisfy the Test. This was an early indication of the way the OFT drew on 
European competition law and jurisprudence as it became dominant in UK law12 (completed with 
the passage of the 1998 Competition Act and 2002 Enterprise Act), as  powers which applied 
specifically to the broadcasting sector increasingly became secondary to general competition 
powers. 
 
The OFT Report rejected the argument made by the ITA in 1972 to the Select Committee on 
Nationalised Industries that ‘if the responsibility for the production of the bulk of the programmes 
which are distributed for national showing is fragmented over too many centres, an uneconomic 
system of working results’ (House of Commons 1972: 41). In the Director General’s view, echoing 
Fraser’s comments in the mid-50s, ‘even with a single network, competition could have existed in 
the supply of programmes to the network’ but the Authority had ‘decided to pick the main suppliers 
itself’ (Office of Fair Trading 1992: 22). 
 
The problems and issues with the recommendations largely went unchallenged, as the primary 
stakeholders in the discussion were the ITV companies seeking a settlement at a time of 
considerable change with the franchise auction, along with the Producers’ Alliance for Cinema and 
                                                 
11 Set up in 1973, the Office of Fair Trading’s operations developed within the framework of developing European 
Competition Law whose provisions influenced various legislative measures before its eventual incorporation into 
substantive UK competition law through the 1998 Competition Act. The OFT subsequently became responsible for 
enforcing competition law following the Enterprise Act 2002. Bryan Carsberg, DGFT when this matter was referred to 
the OFT in compliance with the 1990 Broadcasting Act, had previously been the Director General of OFTEL, the then 
telecommunications regulator. 
12 Cf. Report of the Joint Committee on the Draft Communications Bill 2002,  p.39 
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Television (PACT) eager to further its members’ interests13. The main issue driving the report was 
ostensibly the improvement of access for the independent companies to the newly formed Network 
Centre whereas in fact it was about the ownership of the intellectual property rights (IPR) in 
programmes commissioned by the ITV companies. 
 
The application of the Competition Test was the fulcrum of a revision of the terms underpinning 
broadcasting policy in the UK. Although the ITC, which had replaced the IBA as the regulatory 
authority, and the ITVA appealed to the Monopolies and Mergers Commission (MMC) against the 
OFT recommendations, they were unsuccessful and a slightly revised version of them was imposed. 
This created conditions that pushed competition to the very top of the broadcasting policy agenda. 
Almost unwittingly, competition conditions came centre stage, albeit amplified by PACT’s 
concerted lobbying.  
 
It is little realised that the MMC analysis has influenced all subsequent interventions. Lobbying by 
PACT in the 1990s for better terms of trade – and the supporting evidence of a lack of investment in 
independent production companies – were paralleled by radical changes at ITV after the franchise 
renewals and subsequent wholesale consolidation of the ITV companies. This occurred alongside 
the fundamental transformation of the BBC’s operations through the introduction of Producer 
Choice, catapulting many individuals out of the vertically integrated broadcasters into a more 
precarious existence either as freelancers or in some cases as new entrepreneurs running their own 
production companies. PACT had also complained about the BBC practice of using BBC 
Worldwide investment to deprive producers of what it saw as a fair share of the value of 
programmes in secondary markets. Now markets, profit and shareholder value increasingly took 
priority over wider public interests. The consequences of this revisionist emphasis of the discourse 
of competition were taken up again by the ITC in 2002. The role of the regulator had been 
undermined (or captured) through the successful lobbying of a sympathetic Government by the 
firms and entrepreneurs in the independent production sector (Darlow 2004). 
 
Steemers (2004) provided an account of the series of reports which preceded the legislative changes 
made by the newly elected Labour government after 1997 as it formulated its plans to create a new 
‘converged’ regulator, Ofcom, bringing together nine existing agencies. The White Paper A New 
Future for Communications (2000) continued to subscribe to the need for different regulatory 
frameworks for broadcasting and telecommunications but was emphatic on the benefits of 
                                                 
13 PACT was formed in 1991 when IPPA merged with the TPA (The Producers’ Association). 
13 
competition for ‘consumers’. However, as Steemers notes, this attempted balance between 
competition and public interest was altered during the passage of the legislation so that, as Simpson 
(2004) suggests, competition factors central to telecommunications regulation began to leach into 
those for broadcasting.  
 
The Phillis Report 
The key instrument of change in the relationship between the production sector and the 
commissioning broadcasters in the early 2000s stemmed from the Phillis Report for the 
Independent Television Commission (ITC 2002). This report was commissioned after lobbying by 
independent producers when their concerns seemed to have been overlooked as government 
modernised the regulatory structures.  Its deliberations followed immediately after and 
complemented those of the Joint Committee of the House of Commons and the House of Lords. 
Chaired by Lord Puttnam and with Bryan Carsberg, former DGFT as one of its appointed advisers, 
the Committee had reviewed the draft Communications Bill. The Phillis Report based its evidence 
gathering, analytical framework and interventionist recommendations on the 1993 Monopolies and 
Mergers Commission’s investigation of ITV’s Network Centre. Despite the example of the US 
experience of failure of Fin-Syn (Financial Interest and Syndication Rules), designed to stop the US 
networks monopolizing the broadcast market by preventing them from owning any of the 
programming that they aired in prime time, the Phillis Report recommended similar changes to the 
terms of trade between broadcasters and independent production companies.  Broadcasters would 
fund the programmes they commissioned but would only gain limited transmission rights, with the 
production company able to exploit secondary markets with control over the programme’s IP.  
 
The foundational importance of the Channel 3 Network Arrangements prescribed by the 
Monopolies and Mergers Commission (MMC) in 1993 was made clear in the Phillis Report but the 
competition discourse was elaborated through a series of filters. Buyer power, i.e. the power of the 
broadcasting commissioners, was seen as too great and required intervention to allow a more equal 
negotiation over rights. The analysis of programme supply led to recommendations for the revised 
terms of trade and a code of practice which were subsequently embedded in the Communications 
Act 2003 (S.318)14.  
 
                                                 
14 The ITC Review of the UK Programme Supply Market (the Phillis Report) in 2002 was chaired by Bob Phillis, 
formerly Managing Director at Carlton Television and Deputy Director-General of the BBC, and its membership 
included Ann Bulford (at the time Director of Finance and Business Affairs at the Royal Opera House but now BBC 
Deputy Director-General), and Sir Howard Stringer (then Chairman of Sony). 
14 
This measure was ostensibly designed to boost the ability of the independent sector to create 
sustainable businesses and to profit from the secondary market exploitation of programmes 
commissioned by the public service broadcasters. The market and competition discourse writ large 
in the White Paper A New Future for Communications (DTI/DCMS 2000) had now become 
centrally embedded in and extended to influencing how the British state constituted the relationship 
between the broadcasters and the numerous companies involved across the supply chain. 
Furthermore, although the market was still dominated by the public service broadcasters, it was 
facing increasing competition from Sky, the satellite platform carrying multiple subscription-based 
channels - but these factors were also discounted in the report. The Phillis Report asserted that ‘the 
independent sector remains fragile - producers lack the scale to diversify their risk, and lack the 
right base which would allow them to attract external finance - only a few independents have been 
able to grow sizeable and sustainable businesses at home; and fewer still have made inroads in the 
international marketplace’ (ITC 2002: 5). 
 
The UK’s inability to compete in global markets successfully was also used as evidence of a need 
for change:  
 
There is a more general shortfall in our international competitiveness, which stems from 
a number of factors including: 
- Insufficient scale of our main commercial broadcasters, producers and distributors, in 
a world market increasingly dependent on critical mass for the successful creation 
and exploitation of material. 
- The failure to attract investment and management expertise more widely from around 
the world, including the US. (ITC 2002: 5) 
 
Arguably, the Phillis Report’s prescriptions were based on an incomplete view of market 
developments as they seemingly ignored relevant developments in the US broadcasting market. 
Despite some astute asides about the relevance of the US experience with Fin-Syn, these were 
discounted. It is noteworthy that the report’s conclusions showed how the IBA’s comments on 
sustainability and economic logic in its evidence to the DGFT in 1992 had been borne out by the 
US experience with Fin-Syn, which by 2001 no longer operated. The implications of these changes 
were ignored or not made explicit as they would have contradicted the recommendations. 
  
In many ways the changes levelled the playing field between the BBC and ITV in their relationship 
with independent producers. The 1993 Network Centre agreement had contributed to the weakening 
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of the ITV system which had responded to its rapidly changing market position through the 
consolidation of most franchise holders into a single entity. Indeed, it took more than a decade for 
ITV to recover some stability. In parallel, the path of increased marketisation at the BBC continued 
first, with the introduction of the Window of Creative Competition (WOCC) in 200615 and then, the 
creation of BBC Studios as a commercial subsidiary of BBC Worldwide in 2016. 
 
Some of the formulations in the Phillis Report lacked any significant evidence base or could be 
directly contradicted. Certainly, though, local investment in the independent sector was then 
limited.  Furthermore, there was little questioning by third parties or government of what the 
possible consequences of the Report’s recommendations might be.  The Report has the hallmarks of 
an afterthought to justify a policy change where a decision had already been made. 
  
While there was acknowledgement of the advantages of a mixed economy of companies in the 
production sector, with vertically-integrated firms existing alongside a range of independent 
production companies, it was PACT’s lobbying position which was accepted by the Report. This 
was based on the optimistic prediction that a change to the terms of trade would lead to the creation 
of companies of scale which would be able to compete in global markets (and by implication 
perform better than the incumbents). There is no evidence of any interrogation of the ‘fitness 
landscape’ of the independent sector at that time even though several cross-genre mini-majors were 
already operational. Nor was it asked how changes might affect existing firms: there was merely a 
call for an undifferentiated group of companies to create a critical mass to facilitate global 
competitiveness. The analysis undertaken used the hypothetical monopolist test, i.e. the market 
definition used looked at national and supply/demand activity for programme production and 
effectively ignored the growth of the pay-TV sector and its relationship to production companies. 
 
As noted previously, the Phillis Report’s deliberations followed those of the Joint Committee 
examining the Draft Communications Bill in 2002.  The Report’s recommendation to intervene to 
provide a sustainability cushion for the independent sector through a change in the terms of trade 
laws was confirmed in the legislative provisions of the 2003 Communications Act. However, this 
had been contested during the deliberations of the Joint Committee on the Draft Communications 
Bill by the then Director-General of the BBC, Greg Dyke. While the use of the BBC’s licence fee 
money as ‘venture capital for the nation’s creativity’ was promoted by Tessa Jowell, then Secretary 
of State for Culture, Media and Sport (Joint Committee 2002: 83), Dyke questioned ‘whether it is 
                                                 
15 The Window of Creative Competition enabled in-house and both ‘qualifying’ and ‘non-qualifying’ independent 
producers to compete for 25 per cent of eligible BBC TV commissions each year. 
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the BBC’s job to make large numbers of independent producers extremely rich’ (ibid: 84). This 
view was explicitly ignored as it was seen to underestimate ‘the difficulties facing the average 
independent producer’. Furthermore despite evidence from the BBC on the likely impact of foreign 
capital on the sector this was disregarded too, with the views of City financiers given greater 
weight 16 . Indeed, the Phillis Report recommended ’reduced barriers to overseas investment, 
resources and expertise’ (ITC 2002: 7) in the expectation of greater efficiency and profitability but 
offered no evidence whatsoever to support this contention or suggested any consideration of the 
wider implications. 
 
Implementation of the Report’s recommendations fundamentally altered the conditions under which 
the UK television production sector operates. The rapid consolidation of the independent sector 
after 2004 was not foreseen (Doyle and Paterson 2008). The Report suggested that the need for 
quotas of independent productions on the public service broadcasters should be reviewed once these 
measures had been introduced, as it was believed that the workings of the market over time would 
remove their necessity. That the review by the DCMS in late 2015 led to a decision not to remove 
the quotas is perhaps indicative of a faulty prescription in 2002 and a lack of awareness of the 
unforeseen consequences of likely foreign owned consolidation17. It is also noteworthy that BBC 
production’s separation from the main broadcasting function was considered in the Phillis Report 
and rejected because it ‘would likely impose significant costs on the Corporation’ (ITC 2002:13). 
One must assume these ‘costs’ were transaction costs though this is not specified. And of course, in 
2016 the BBC itself implemented precisely this structure with the creation of BBC Studios as a 
subsidiary of BBC Worldwide, claiming it would improve competitiveness, innovation and value 
for money and allow the BBC to attract the best staff to provide programmes for commissions from 
both the BBC and other broadcasters (BBC 2016: 24). This underlines the long-term structural 
impact of the competitiveness agenda. 
 
Ignoring lessons from the USA 
The neglect of the evidence available for the ending of US regulatory interventions through the Fin-
Syn rules is perplexing. It is unclear what role Howard Stringer, chairman of Sony, by then the only 
US studio without a broadcast network, played in the formulation of the Phillis Report. Major 
changes of ownership had begun in the US broadcasting market when the expiry of the Fin-Syn 
                                                 
16 The BBC’s consultation on the BBC Studios proposals (BBC, 2016) uses the outcome of these policy changes as 
part of its justification for making its production activity a subsidiary of its commercial arm BBC Worldwide. 
17 Ofcom carried out a review of terms of trade at request of then Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport 
(Ofcom, 2015). 
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rules once again allowed the broadcast networks to hold a financial interest in all the shows in their 
line-ups. This had opened the floodgates to a series of mergers and acquisitions: Disney and ABC in 
1996, Paramount and CBS in 2000, and then later Universal and NBC in 2004. The issues 
associated with vertical integration and the role of buyer power were not fully examined by the 
Phillis Report. This did not sufficiently grasp the wider implications for UK broadcasting 
companies which were unlikely to match the scale and reach of an integrated US major. Indeed, 
Kunz (2009) noted that ‘Sony Pictures is the one major not aligned with a broadcast network. In 
2001, Sony announced that it planned to halt development of new prime-time programming because 
of the challenges that non-aligned producers faced and in 2003 it was a member of the Coalition for 
Program Diversity that called on the FCC to institute a 25% “Independent Producer Rule”’ (ibid: 
645). 
 
A number of academics examined the Fin-Syn rules at the time of their demise. Rosencrans (1990) 
described the rationale for the Fin-Syn rules as:  
 
(1) to enhance the profitability of program producers;  
(2) to restrain or diminish the networks’ bargaining power, resulting from their control 
of access to their affiliated stations, which was allegedly used to extract syndication 
rights and other financial interests from producers; and  
(3) to prevent the networks from favouring the programs in which they had acquired 
these interests. 
 
In other words, these were the very same set of objectives as PACT was seeking.  
 
However, the outcome of the Fin-Syn arrangements had been that rather than increasing the 
profitability of the programme suppliers by enabling them to charge higher fees for the network 
licences, the networks merely paid less for a licence which did not include syndication rights so that 
‘deficit financing’ became critical. With larger production companies, such as movie studio 
divisions, able to spread the risk in a way similar to the networks, power became increasingly 
concentrated in the hands both of the networks and studios. Consequently, as Covington (1994: 5) 
notes, although the original set of financial interest and syndication rules was adopted to curb ‘the 
excessive power of the three major broadcasting networks in the financing, development and 
syndication of television programming’ and to ‘promote diversity of programming sources and 
distributors’ it failed and the beneficiaries were not undercapitalized new entrants but rather the 
Hollywood production studios. It is regrettable that these dynamics in the US market – seen as the 
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best comparator to imitate – were not considered when the changes in the Terms of Trade in the UK 
were recommended. In fact, the issue of deficit financing, and the role of distributors in meeting 
producer needs, became a critical factor accelerating consolidation as the companies making 
acquisitions were financially strong and often vertically integrated with an existing distribution arm. 
What the Phillis Report failed to consider was the complexity of the balance of forces that would 
emerge after a change in the terms of trade in the UK. Without powerful studios to combat ‘network 
commissioning power’ in the UK there was a naive supposition that foreign investment would be a 
neutral factor in the market and provide a countervailing force. In some ways this has indeed 
occurred but it has not meant a stronger UK sector, merely the acquisition of UK companies by 
foreign investors coming from an array of interests – the studios, networks and new media 
companies. Again, it is worth noting how the US national interest was invoked in the debate about 
Fin-Syn, with the networks claiming they needed to be able ‘to compete with foreign giants who 
buy up the major producers of their programming with a consensus […] building that if the U.S. 
will not limit the domestic investment opportunities available to foreigners, it must at least ensure 
that American companies are not actively disadvantaged’ (Rosencrans 1990: 75). The harsh reality 
against which the ‘competition enamoured’ Phillis Report took its position was the conclusion of 
Goolsbee’s 2007 report for the FCC report that ‘primetime broadcast television is a heavily 
vertically integrated endeavour and one can see that the life of an independent producer of 
programming is likely to be rather difficult’ (quoted in Kunz, 2009: 638). Or as The Economist 
(2016) recently noted, in the US ‘whichever way the wind blew, big companies showed a genius for 
turning federal regulations into barriers to entry’.  
 
In the narrower context of television drama production in the USA once Fin-Syn was scrapped, 
Kunz (2009: 645) found that in the 2004-05 and 2005-06 seasons, less than a handful of comedy 
and fictional programmes came from outside the six major conglomerates and were sold across the 
world. The Phillis Report was aware of the possibility of generating revenue through both 
traditional and non-traditional markets but ignored the oligopolistic structures in the global market. 
The analysis was wrong, the prescriptions were wrong and the Creative Industries Federation’s 
lament in 2014 about the lack of scalable UK companies was an indictment of the measures taken. 
Now, UK production companies have been acquired and are tied to foreign distributors. 
 
So, there is a dilemma which has to be resolved in the UK if scalable UK companies are indeed 
needed in this sector. The interventionist framework was seen as required to resolve conflicting 
industrial positions and was premised on beneficial consequences resulting for global 
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competitiveness, claiming a public interest in the competitive supply market in broadcasting. 
Buyers’ power, where there are many sellers but few buyers, was seen as a negative attribute even 
though the welfare and economic consequences were arguably positive for the UK. The prospect of 
growth through foreign investment was seen as needed to build a sector which could become self-
renewing. The application of competition law alone to support interventions ignored the fact that 
rapid technological change was underway and a global market was emerging with unknown effects 
both in terms of programme production and distribution.  
 
Aftermath 
The responses within the UK’s remaining vertically integrated companies have been different. The 
BBC introduced the Window of Creative Competition (WOCC) in 2006 partly in response to the 
fact that a  growing proportion of third-party commissions were no longer eligible as part of the 
statutory quota as they were produced by ‘non-qualifying’ producers which had become key players 
due to the emergence of the ‘super indies’, as consolidation between independent companies 
continued18. The BBC wished to be able to access programmes from these companies to ensure its 
schedule remained competitive. In parallel there was an increased focus on the operations of BBC 
Worldwide and its investment activities reflected a growing realisation of the need modernise the 
BBC’s organisational practices and to address the global market. These changes had been underway 
at least since the 1990s 19  with the introduction of Producer Choice and major organisational 
changes to enable the establishment of full programme costings and greater efficiency (Birt 2004; 
Paterson 1993). With the progressive impact and influence of the market agenda, ten years later 
these changes resulted in the BBC’s decision noted above to effectively commercialise its 
production arm (as BBC Studios) and become an active investor through BBC Worldwide in other 
production companies. This was justified in terms of its claim to need to maintain a continuing flow 
of new programmes to sustain its longstanding position as a major global distributor (BBC 2016: 
29). ITV also responded to market changes with a series of strategic changes. These emerged 
haphazardly after 2004 as the newly-consolidated company negotiated an ever-more competitive 
fitness landscape but with its ownership now open to foreign takeover as a result of the changes in 
the Communications Act 2003. Its focus on content in recent years, through the acquisition of 
companies both in the UK and overseas, has led to a significant rebalancing of its income streams 
while its distribution arm has been recognised as an important adjunct to its production efforts. 
                                                 
18 Non-qualifying producers are defined by the level of the shareholding by a broadcaster which is active in the UK 
market. If this is below 25% the company is still considered legally ‘independent’. 
19 In fact, they had been a factor since the 1980s. Investment by BBC Enterprises, BBC Worldwide’s predecessor, 
sometimes had a material impact on the programming. See Paterson (1984) on investment in Boys from the Blackstuff.   
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The market mechanisms introduced into the production sector have led to a changed relationship 
between broadcasters and producers so that distributors are now a fundamental part of the equation. 
The growing importance of distribution in securing the finances for high-cost programmes has been 
overshadowed somewhat by the continued focus on production. There is no lack of competition 
between distributors in global markets but in the UK, as in production, the distribution sector is now 
dominated by foreign-owned companies20 with deficit financing provided through these companies 
now a very significant factor in high-end production alongside the tax incentive regime21.  
 
The effect of consolidation in production and an emphasis on global markets has meant that UK 
television - formerly financially self-sufficient from advertising and licence fee revenues – has had 
to concede market space. What the regulators have not done - because the legislation doesn’t 
require this and the UK Government seems unaware of its relevance - is look at the competitiveness 
of the distribution sector. Here, the evidence of the film sector’s overwhelming dependence on US 
investment provides a far from optimistic long-term prospect for success. 
 
The creation of a mixed economy of supply may be the most beneficial and indeed preferred 
outcome but arguably it is of concern if, as has happened, ownership is transferred outside the UK. 
The danger is that over time this may lead to a reduction in expressions of British culture and result 
in an impoverished production sector dependent on the whim of foreign conglomerates. 
 
It is concerning that every intervention made since the 1980s has led to a gradual weakening of the 
UK-owned vertically integrated broadcasters, which until then had underpinned the high standing of 
British television around the world. This contrasts significantly with the US where, since the 1990s, 
after a period of separation between production and broadcasting, there has been significant 
concentration and intensified vertical integration with the merger of the globally powerful studios 
and the domestically powerful networks. The UK independent sector now proudly boasts of its 
export achievements. Arguably this is not wholly beneficial, with consolidation and increased 
foreign ownership of much of it competing on a global stage through US owned distribution 
companies. And as a consequence the programmes being commissioned are increasingly targeted at 
a global rather than a British audience. The UK TV drama production sector may be in danger of 
                                                 
20 There have been significant changes to this sector since Steemers (2004) mapped the UK companies which were 
operational in distribution in the early 2000s with many not surviving the financial downturn after 2008. See Broadcast 
(2009). 
21  Tax relief for high-end television production was introduced by the UK Government in 2013.  
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following the pattern of the UK film industry - small and innovative but dwarfed by the US majors, 
while producing programming in the UK but for global audiences.  
 
The new terms of trade led to rapid consolidation so that foreign-owned ‘super-indies’ emerged 
acquiring existing production companies with both their human capital and the ownership of the 
intellectual property inherent in programmes and formats. These developments will be further 
elaborated in a related working paper. At one level, the global competitiveness of UK-based 
companies has improved but this was at the cost of the ownership of many companies passing to 
overseas companies. The UK’s main global competitive body in distribution, BBC Worldwide, 
became more important in contributing to financing the BBC as the licence fee income came under 
greater pressure. After 2010, ITV emerged from a decade of decline, beginning to acquire 
independent production companies both in the UK and USA as well as investing in start-ups with 
an emphasis on owning content with global potential. 
 
With foreign ownership of all but one (Tinopolis) of the consolidated super-indies (All3Media, 
Endemol Shine, Fremantle), and ownership of other key production companies by overseas studios 
(Sony Pictures Television, Warner Bros. TV, NBC Universal, Studio Canal), the Phillis Report’s 
prescription in 2001 of greater foreign investment has been realised. With the emergence of new 
buyers such as Netflix, Amazon Prime and Sky there is continuing change and Britain’s place as a 
global centre of production in the market is now increasingly reliant on these foreign-owned 
vertically integrated companies, particularly the US studios which, after the end of the Fin-Syn 
arrangements, acquired networks and reinforced their position in global markets. The UK 
interventions have arguably weakened the domestic industry by making it dependent. They have 
certainly altered the trajectory from one where, despite talking about the interests of audiences in 
preparing legislative proposals, there has been a reduction in the public interest legacy and its 
replacement by market precepts. In short, the firms making the programmes - particularly narrative 
fiction - are now addressing a global market and frequently are both foreign-owned and reliant on 
deficit financing from their parent company. The legacy British broadcasters, though still key 
funders of commissioning and still vertically integrated, have decreasing influence on the world 
stage. They have been adopting the approach of the super-indies through investment in or 
acquisition of independent companies to respond to the market conditions and secure commissions. 
 
The issue of scale remains. The over emphasis on start-ups and the clipping of the wings of the 
UK’s vertically integrated companies of scale has coincided with the increasing globalization of the 
market for television. There are always choices for administrations and governments as they 
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respond to effective lobbying campaigns which cleverly invoke current political ideologies. 
Evidence-based policy is supposed to counter such efforts but when the evidence itself fails to take 
account of the key players in the global value chain, it can lead to faulty prescriptions. When the 
consequences of the decisions following the 1993 MMC recommendations are reviewed in the light 
of current economic and political realities they can be seen to have led to a series of decisions 
which undermined a successful UK-owned sector and, unwittingly, allowed foreign-owned 
companies to secure increasing advantage. This is justified as inward investment but in fact it is a 
sacrifice of considerable national autonomy by an industry which is about making culture as well as 
a profit.  It is impossible to put the competition genie back in the bottle but it should be possible to 
ensure the continued existence of national champions which aspire to represent the UK in all its 
diversity and to meet the public interest expectations which once dominated. The determined use of 
competition law has certainly led to multiple business models in the TV production sector and has 
benefited some producers handsomely as their companies have been acquired by overseas firms. 
The sector is much lauded but in truth now very fragile and potentially prone to the whims of 
foreign owners.  
 
The consequences of these changes for the business models and operations of companies producing 
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